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    Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: 
Ex Ante Control Mechanisms versus Ex Post Transaction Review 
Ronald J. Gilson* and Alan Schwartz** 
August 2012 
Abstract 
 We consider how the state should regulate the consumption of pecuniary private 
benefits of control by controlling shareholders.  These benefits have efficient aspects: 
they compensate the controlling shareholder for monitoring managers and for investing 
effort to create and implement projects.  Controlling shareholders, however, have 
incentives to consume excessive benefits.  We argue here that ex post judicial review of 
controlled transactions is superior to ex ante restrictions on the creation of controlled 
structures: the latter form of regulation eliminates the efficiencies as well as the abuses of 
the controlled company form.  We also argue that controlling shareholders should be 
permitted to contract with minority investors over permissible private benefit 
consumption.  Neither ex post regulation nor contract works well, however, when courts 
are inefficient and inexpert.  Hence, our principal normative claim is that a European 
level corporate court should be created, whose jurisdiction parties can invoke in their 
charters or other contracts. 
 
I.  Introduction 
This paper takes as its foundation four central facts.  First, control blocks in 
corporations with public shareholders are pervasive.  Only a handful of countries have 
capital markets that are dominated by companies whose control is in the public float.1  
Second, control blocks do not exist, as the Law and Finance literature2 would have it, 
                                                
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, Marc and Eva Stern 
Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School, and European Corporate Governance Institute 
** Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Professor, Yale School of Management.  The authors 
are grateful to Luca Enriques, Guido Ferrarini  and to participants at the  JITE Seminar on the Behavioral 
Theory of Institutions for helpful comments   
1 The evidence is summarized in Ronald J. Gilson, “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate 
Governance:  Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy”, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (2006). 
2 See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998). 
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only in consequence of weak corporate governance law. 3  Control blocks are also 
pervasive in “good law” jurisdictions such as Sweden, and commonplace in others such 
as the United States.4  These controlling shareholders may exist because they have better 
techniques for  monitoring management (or for better managing the corporation) than the 
monitoring techniques used in public corporations without a controlling shareholder – for 
example, independent boards of directors and the market for corporate control.5  Third, in 
both good and bad law jurisdictions, shareholders often acquire control with “leverage” – 
the set of techniques that give controlling shareholders voting rights that exceed their 
cash flow equity rights.  Examples are dual class common stock structures in which the 
controlling shareholders hold high vote stock and public shareholders hold low vote 
stock; and pyramids in which shareholders that control the top firm with a majority equity 
stake control lower firms, with only minority equity stakes. 
Fourth, recent reforms restrict agents’ ability to secure control blocks, especially 
those that use leverage.  Many countries prohibit dual class common stock structures.6  A 
report to the European Commission by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
recommended a “proportionality principle”, requiring voting rights and equity 
                                                
3The expressed concern is that controlling shareholders are reluctant to yield control because the law 
would permit the new controlling group to exploit them.   
4 See Gilson, supra note 1.   In the U.S., roughly six percent (by number, not value) of public 
corporations have two classes of common stock with insiders owning the higher vote stock and the pubic 
owning lower vote shares.  Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An 
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1051 (2010). 
5 Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, “Contracting About Private Benefits of Control” (working paper, 
August (2012)); see also Gilson, supra note 1; Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, “Controlling Controlling 
Shareholders”, 152 U.Penn. L.Rev. 785 (2003). 
6 Institutional Shareholder Services, Sherman & Sterling & the European Corporate Governance 
Institute, Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union  (2007).  Dual class common stock 
is allowed in only half of the countries surveyed in this report. 
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participation to match.7  This recommendation led the European Commission to initiate a 
report on the legality and actual use of leveraged control in the European Union.8  Dual 
class common stock is also prohibited in Israel, and a recent Israeli government 
commission recommended severely limiting leveraged control through pyramid 
structures.9  Even when leveraged control is absent, European Union law nevertheless 
disadvantages controlling shareholders in public corporations through the mandatory bid 
rule, that requires a shareholder who crosses a thirty percent ownership threshold to offer 
to purchase the shares of all other shareholders at an average of the recent prices that the 
thirty percent shareholder paid to acquire its stake.10 
 This actual and proposed regulation is intended to prevent controlling 
shareholders from consuming private benefits of control (“PBC”) -- a pecuniary or non-
pecuniary gain that a shareholder acquires through use of its controlling position,  and 
which is not shared with public shareholders.  A pecuniary private benefit, for example, 
may accrue to a controller through an interested transaction, in which the controlling 
shareholder stands on both sides of the deal.   On one side is the company he controls; on 
                                                
7 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2011) 
8 Report on the Proportionality Principle, supra note 6.  These reports and inquiries did not lead the 
European Commission to propose regulatory action. 
9 See Israeli Recommendations of the Committee on Enhancing Competiveness (2011).  The authors 
filed a report on behalf of certain Israeli pyramid groups analyzing the proposed restrictions. 
10 The mandatory bid rule originated in its 1972 adoption in the City Code by the UK Takeover Panel.  
See Takeover Panel, Announcement by the City Working Party 1972/2, at 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/1972-02.pdf   It was applied EU wide 
through the Takeover Directive in 2004.   See Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, O.J. L 142, 12.   Prior to that point, most member states had 
adopted a form of mandatory bid rule in their domestic law. 
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the other side is a company in which the controller has a larger equity stake.11  A 
pecuniary PBC exists when the transaction terms unduly favor the entity in which the 
controlling shareholder has the higher equity stake.12   
 PBC are regulated because they are believed to disadvantage minority 
shareholders, whose returns fall as the controllers take a disproportionate share of the 
corporation’s profits.  On this view, leveraged control is particularly problematic because 
it facilitates the controlling shareholder’s ability to consume PBC, in particular by 
diverting assets to entities in which the controlling shareholder has greater equity.13  But 
PBC have virtues as well as vices.  They compensate controlling shareholders for the 
monitoring they provide and the diversification they yield to maintain control.  Leveraged 
control permits controlling shareholders to exploit economies of scale and scope in 
monitoring and managerial talents.  Leverage also reduces the extent of firm specific risk 
the controlling shareholder must bear and for which he otherwise would have to be 
compensated.   
As premise to discussing regulatory strategies, we note that some balance of the 
virtues and vices of PBC consumption exists today.  To see how, let there be no credible 
constraints on how much of the public shareholders’ investment the controlling 
                                                
11 Vadimir A. Atansov, Bernard Black & Conrad C. Ciccitelloi, Law and Tunneling, 37 J. Corp. L. 1 
(2011), provide a detailed taxonomy of different methods by which a controlling shareholder can extract 
PBC. 
12 The treatment of PBC also figure prominently in the literature discussing sales of corporate control.  
For present purposes, we treat the issue of PBC in control sales as derivative of the rules governing PBC in 
the ongoing operation of the company – i.e., the value of PBC in the sale of control  is just the capitalized 
value of the PBC generated in the company’s operations.  See Gilson & Gordon, Controlling Controlling 
Shareholders, supra note 4. 
13 In East Asia for example, the level of PBC is increasing in the difference between a controlling 
shareholder’s equity and control.  See Stijin Classens et. al., “Disentangling the Incentive and 
Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings”, 57 J. Fin. 2471 (2002).  This result also holds in the United 
States.  See Paul H. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, supra note 4. 
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shareholder can divert.  Then, the controlling shareholder would take everything.  On the 
other hand, there would be nothing to take: investors with rational expectations would not 
hold equity in controlled companies.  Put another way, if the controlling shareholder 
cannot commit to restrict his consumption of PBC, “why is not the value of minority 
shares … -- and, it follows, the number of minority shareholders zero?”14  The existence 
of controlled companies thus implies that their controllers today credibly commit, in 
some imprecise ways, to some limits on PBC consumption.  The relevant question, then, 
is whether the state should attempt to improve the controlling shareholder/minority 
shareholder deal or attempt to stamp out PBC consumption altogether. 
In general, two regulatory strategies address PBC: ex ante regulatory restrictions that 
constrain or prohibit leveraged capital structures or more generally restrict the existence 
of a structure with a controlling shareholder and public minority shareholders; and ex 
post judicial review of transactions that a controlling shareholder can use to extract PBC, 
but without restricting the adoption of a controlling shareholder structure.  Regarding the 
former, roughly half of European Union countries prohibit dual class common stock, and 
others limit the extent of the preferential voting rights the controlling shareholders can 
hold.  Sweden limits the high voting class to 10 times the lower voting class; France 
limits it to two times.15  A mandatory bid rule operates to constrain the controlling 
shareholder/public minority shareholders structure by requiring that a shareholder who 
obtains a large percentage of voting rights -- typically 30 percent – must offer to purchase 
                                                
14 Ronald J. Gilson, “Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational 
Exchange”, 60 Stan. L.Rev. 633, 634-35 (2007). 
15 Report on the Proportionality Principle, supra note 6. 
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all minority shares. 16 These restrictions rest on the premise that PBC consumption is 
altogether bad, so the opportunity of controlling shareholders to consume them (or sell 
them) should be restricted or eliminated.  Because regulatory “slippage” exists, most 
countries also impose a higher standard of judicial review on transactions that could 
provide a vehicle for the extraction of PBC.17  Alternatively, ex post review of interested 
transactions accepts the potential that controlling shareholders may add value, and so 
seeks to assure that the net (of PBC) benefits the controllers create are positive.18 
 Thus, there is a regulatory continuum between ex ante structural restrictions on 
control structures and ex post transaction review.  Europe and the United States rest at 
different points along that continuum.  European countries rely more heavily on ex ante 
structural restrictions;19 the United States almost entirely forgoes structural reform in 
favor of ex post judicial review that evaluates particular transactions in which PBC may 
be extracted.20   As an example, the European mandatory bid rules protect public 
shareholders against being frozen into a corporation with a controlling shareholder and 
therefore risking dilution through the extraction of private benefits.  The United States, in 
                                                
16 This framing differs from the usual presentation of a mandatory bid rule as one that prevents an 
existing controlling shareholder from selling control at a premium not shared with minority shareholders. 
17 Luca Enriques, The Law on Company Directors’ Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis, 2 Intn’l & 
Comp. Corp. L.J. 297 (2000), provides a survey of European legal regimes concerning director self-
dealing. 
18 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 4, provide some empirical support for the proposition that 
markets efficiently assess the level of the controlling shareholder’s extraction of private benefits.  The 
authors’ empirical work demonstrates that dual-class firms experience no negative abnormal returns over 
the period of their study.  This implies that shareholders pay a price that accurately discounts the level of 
PBC extraction, 
19 EU member states also limit the terms of the transactions through which controlling shareholders 
may extract PBC.  See Enriques, supra note 17. Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, 
Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany and Italy, 4 
ECFR 491 (2007).  As we stress later, however, the terms of the substantive law are of limited significance 
in the absence of effective enforcement. 
20 Pennsylvania, for example, has a mandatory bid rule, but it was enacted to deter hostile tender offers 
rather than to increase the size of a controlling shareholder’s equity investment.   
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contrast, constrains a controlling shareholder from extracting PBC through freezing out 
public shareholders by subjecting a freezeout transaction to searching judicial scrutiny.21   
Similarly, no U.S. state limits the use of dual class stock.22 While the United States does 
restrict the use of pyramids by taxing inter-company dividends when the recipient 
company does not own 85 percent of the payer company, dividends are only the most 
observable way of transferring corporate resources.  PBC extracted through inter-
company dealings or other mechanisms are not taxed as dividends, so the inter-company 
dividend tax is not a complete barrier to a pyramid structure. 
The policy question usually asked is whether structural reform or judicial review is 
the better way to stamp out PBC consumption. We ask a different question here: how 
should the state maximize the virtues and restrict the vices of PBC consumption? The 
answer, we argue, is to provide mechanisms through which controlling shareholders can 
credibly commit to limit PBC consumption to efficient levels – where the gains from 
better monitoring and management exceed the PBC cost to minority shareholders.  
Our analysis proceeds as follows.  In Part II, we analyze the tradeoff between ex ante 
and ex post regulation.  We make two points here.  First, ex post regulation of PBC 
consumption can take two forms.  (a) The state can retain the mandatory rules that 
prohibit contracting about levels of PBC consumption.  Delaware courts, for example, 
now use these rules to regulate transactions that implicate PBC under the entire fairness 
                                                
21 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5. 
22 While stock exchange rules restrict dual class common stock in the U.S., the limit is only with 
respect to creating a dual class structure by changes in the voting rights of existing classes of stock.  
Companies are free to issue new classes of limited voting stock, as many of the new technology companies 
have done – e.g., Google, Zynga, Facebook and Groupon. 
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standard.  The efficient consumption of PBC, as just defined, should satisfy the standard.  
(b) Alternatively, the state could reduce mandatory rules to defaults. This would permit 
parties to regulate PBC consumption under express contracts between controlling 
shareholders and shareholder representatives, such as disinterested directors, perhaps 
with the approval of disinterested shareholders.23  Courts then would carefully scrutinize 
these contracts to ensure that they meet appropriate procedural standards, such as 
disclosure of relevant facts to the approving body. Second, either ex post regulatory 
method – direct judicial review or contracting with court review -- is preferable to ex ante 
structural restrictions because structural restrictions, when effective, constrain PBC by 
restricting the incidence of controlling shareholders.  This result is undesirable because 
controlling shareholders can increase the value of minority shares conditional on the 
efficient level of PBC consumption, which, in general, is positive. 24  In Part III, we 
examine the institutional infrastructure necessary to support an ex post review approach 
to constraining private benefits of control.  We show that the effectiveness of an ex post 
standard is increasing in the expertise of the reviewing court because of the reduced 
likelihood of judicial error.25  The lower the error probability, we argue, the larger is the 
set of efficient projects controlled companies will pursue. 
                                                
23 Delaware General Corporation Law section 122(17) provides an example of this approach.  The 
section authorizes a corporation by contract or in its charter to alter the application of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine. 
24 Paul Mahoney provides evidence that pyramids in the U.S. existing before the Pubic Utility Holding 
Company Act (“PUHCA”) prohibited their use in the utility industry managed this balance.  The value of 
both the top tier company and its controlled subsidiaries increased on news suggesting that the PUHCA 
would not be enacted and decreased on news favorable to its passage.  Paul G. Mahony, The Public Utility 
Pyramids, 41 J. Leg. Stud. 37 (2012). 
25 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert E. Scott, “Text and Context: An Integrated Theory of 
Contract Interpretation” (working paper, 2012). 
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We emphasize that the effectiveness of judicial review -- both the quality of the 
judges and the institutional structure that provides an unbiased outcome within a 
commercially reasonable period of time – is more important than the detail of the legal 
standard that a country adopts.  Professors Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici make just 
this point with respect to the Parmalat scandal, which involved large transfers of PBC 
through interested transactions: 
“[I]talian substantive rules cannot be blamed for what happened.  Indeed, we argue … 
that the existing Italian substantive rules that were in place during Parmalat’s last decade 
were sufficient and, somewhat surprisingly, were even more severe than those in the US.  
If Italian gatekeepers were undeterred, do not blame Italian substantive rules, blame 
enforcement.”26 
 
Part IV asks how to implement an ex post review strategy in countries that lack 
effective enforcement institutions.  To illustrate the question’s importance, consider a 
company that wishes to limit PBC consumption that is incorporated in a country without 
effective courts as we have defined them.  An equilibrium that has “commitment 
contracts” between the controlling group and outside investors that restrict PBC 
consumption would violate subgame perfection.  After outside investors contribute 
money to a company, the controlling shareholder has an incentive to exceed a contractual 
cap because he anticipates the lack of an effective judicial check.  As a consequence, 
equilibria likely would be pooling: well and badly governed companies would face the 
same inefficiently high cost of capital. 
We offer two suggestions for mechanisms that improve the ability of controlling 
shareholders to credibly commit to efficient levels of PBC.  The first, and more modest, 
                                                
26 Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Guidici, Financial Scandals and the role of Private Enforcement: The 
Parmalat Case in After Enron 159 (J. Armour & J. McCahery Eds. 2006).   
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proposes that the European Union could facilitate credible commitment by controlling 
shareholders in countries with weak judicial enforcement by establishing an EU level 
commercial court, whose jurisdiction a corporation could opt into through its articles of 
incorporation or in important contracts.  The court would apply the law of the state of 
incorporation.27   Rather than harmonizing substantive law, this approach would help 
controlled companies to commit credibly to ceilings on PBC already set out in existing 
substantive law in the member state of incorporation.   The second suggestion is 
consistent with and extends the first: member states could amend existing, typically 
mandatory, substantive law in a critical respect:  existing legal standards would become 
default rules, allowing corporations to make explicit tailored commitments with respect 
to PBC consumption.  Part V concludes. 
II.  The Tradeoff Between Ex Ante and Ex Post Regulation 
 We begin by setting out how agency costs exist in companies with widely 
distributed shareholders and professional managers who hold a small portion of the 
company’s cash flow rights, which we call Berle and Means (“B&M”) companies.28 How 
agency costs are addressed in B&M companies is useful background for analyzing the 
various legal responses to agency costs in companies that have a controlling shareholder. 
A. The pervasive potential for agency costs 
                                                
27 One precedent for a voluntary election of EU level regulation is the European Company Law, which 
does not displace member state corporate law, but allows individual companies to opt into EU level 
institutions.  See Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L.294) 1 (EC); Council Directive 2001/86, 
2001 O.J. (L294) 22 (EC). 
28 We refer to a company in which shareholders are widely diversified and the managers have effective 
control but hold a small fraction of cash flow rights as a Berle and Means company, after the scholars who 
first characterized this organizational form.  See Adolph Berle & Gardiner Means, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (1932). 
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Agency problems exist whenever shareholders invest in a company they do not 
control.  The benefits that result from the specialization that capital markets make 
possible  – investors in risk bearing and managers in managing – also create the potential 
for agency costs.  Beginning with benefits, public shareholders usually hold diversified 
stock portfolios.  Therefore, they do not bear firm specific risk, and so need not be paid to 
bear it.  Diversification, that is, reduces capital costs.  In turn, the opportunity for an 
entrepreneur to secure external capital on good terms allows managers to specialize in 
management: a good manager need not contribute substantial capital to the enterprise.  
This specialization has allowed the professionalization of management. 
Specialization, however, creates the potential for two broad categories of agency cost.  
First, managers may manage inefficiently (evoking their legal duty of care); second, 
managers may favor themselves at the expense of minority shareholders (evoking their 
legal duty of loyalty).  Efficient specialization requires that the law effectively address 
these derelictions.  Minority shareholders will not reduce them by monitoring.  Because 
of risk bearing specialization, non-controlling shareholders lack both the expertise to 
monitor the performance of specialized managers and the incentive to do so – their 
individual holdings are too small to warrant the effort. The minority is rationally passive.  
A company’s cost of capital reflects the agency costs that its structure permits.29 
B. Controlling Agency Costs without a Controlling Shareholder 
                                                
29 Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article is the canonical account of the role of agency costs in corporate 
organization.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). 
12 
 
 B& M companies address these generic agency problems in a distinctive fashion, 
whose outline highlights the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post approaches to a 
controlling shareholder’s PBC.  
1. Lack of diligence and poor performance 
The techniques for protecting minority shareholders should vary with the type of 
agency cost presented.  Ex post judicial review is ill suited to addressing bad 
management; courts are poor institutions for policing a lack of managerial diligence or 
poor manager performance.30 Denote a realized firm project as v, commonly v = f(e,!), 
where e is managerial effort and ! is a stochastic state variable.  Courts seldom can 
observe either effort or the probability distribution of states against which the company 
made its effort choice.  Put simply,  a reviewing court cannot determine, based on a 
single observation, whether an observed unfavorable outcome was the result of bad  luck 
(managers predicted the right probability distribution but the outcome was unfavorable) 
or bad judgment (managers predicted the wrong probability distribution and the 
unfavorable outcome would have been expected if they had gotten it right in the first 
place).  As a result, even jurisdictions with good courts severely restrict judicial inquiry 
into managerial performance in the absence of a conflict of interest.  In the United States, 
the business judgment rule immunizes most managerial behavior from judicial scrutiny. 31 
 Restricting judicial review of allegedly poor management performance does not 
leave management insulated from review; rather, markets are a more effective institution 
for policing managerial performance.  Specialized analysts who can evaluate a pattern of 
                                                
30 We use the phrase “managers” to refer both to directors and managers unless otherwise indicated. 
31 See, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance section 4.01 (1994). 
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events rather than a single occurrence undertake the policing task.  Repeated poor 
performance causes a company’s share price to drop and also risks more dramatic 
responses, such as a proxy fight, a takeover, active shareholder interventions to change 
corporate policy and, in the worst case, creditor actions that force bankruptcy.  Therefore, 
an effective match between problem and remedy exists regarding managerial lack of 
diligence or poor performance in B&M companies. The policing task is assigned to the 
market rather than to the courts.32 
2. Regulating PBC consumption: disloyalty  and interested transactions 
In contrast to market review of performance issues, legal rules are the primary 
defense to agency costs that present as disloyalty or self-interested transactions. 
Interested transactions may have economic value, so the better strategy apparently is to 
subject them to judicial review rather than prohibition.  Statutes and courts create, and 
courts apply, standards to assess the terms of self interested transactions.  The basic 
question standards pose is whether the terms of a self-dealing transaction sufficiently 
resemble the terms that would obtain from arms’ length bargaining in the same 
transaction type.  
 An effective court commonly can recover the facts relevant to answering this 
question.  Contract terms and prices are verifiable, market prices for similar transactions 
may exist, and expert testimony is often useful.  Hence, courts can effectively police self 
dealing: that is, they can apply the equivalence test.  Parties that anticipate effective 
judicial oversight are induced to conform their ex ante behavior to the law. 
                                                
32 The compensation contract also responds to poor managerial performance.  We abstract from 
compensation issues here because our focus is on legal institutions. 
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 In sum, the law matches the agency problems that attend B&M companies to the 
most effective responses.   Courts police conflicts of interest,and the capital market 
polices lack of diligence or poor performance. 
C.  Controlling Agency Costs with a Controlling Shareholder 
1. Lack of diligence and poor performance 
 The analysis above argued that markets are better than courts at controlling poor 
managerial performance.  Controlling shareholders may be better still.33  A controlling 
shareholder commonly has the skills, the opportunity and the incentive to monitor 
manager diligence and performance in the publically held company.  Regarding skills, the 
controlling shareholder usually is himself an industry expert; regarding opportunity, the 
controlling shareholder participates in the business in an ongoing way; regarding 
incentives, the controlling shareholder commonly has both nontrivial cash flow rights and 
the opportunity to divert returns from successful projects to himself, which gives him an 
incentive to make projects successful. 
 In comparison to a controlling shareholder, markets are an inexact method of 
control, even if better than courts.  Markets best respond to obviously poor performance, 
which is observable  in cause and extent --  when the magnitude of lost value is large and 
the steps necessary to address poor performance are straightforward.  In particular, 
markets respond late to problems that require deep knowledge of the corporation’s 
business and operations to evaluate; even when poor performance is observable to 
outsiders, assessing the precise causes and how they can be addressed may not be.   Also, 
                                                
33 See Gilson, “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy”, supra note 1; Ronald J Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders”,  
supra note 4. 
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the large premiums in takeovers, especially hostile ones, suggest that managerial poor 
performance must be significant and persistent before markets act. 
 Controlling shareholders do not suffer from the limited vision outsiders have into 
the corporation’s actual workings.  Thus, they are an effective alternative to market 
policing of the agency cost of managerial shirking and poor performance, behaviors that 
result from the specialization of management in the modern company.  Public 
shareholders’ specialization in risk bearing creates the managerial independence that 
permits managers both to mismanage as well as to maximize value.  A controlling 
shareholder, including those relying on leveraged control (for example, dual class 
common stock and pyramids),  can respond effectively to mismanagement, and so may 
better help the controlled company to realize the gains from professional management at 
lower agency costs than do markets.     
2.  Disloyal and Self-Interested Transactions 
 The existence of a controlling shareholder as a high-powered performance 
monitor, however, poses a heightened risk of self-dealing.  The very scale and scope 
economies that permit better monitoring also create the potential for greater consumption 
of PBC.  In advanced economies, the law responds to loyalty and self-dealing issues in 
controlled companies in much the same way as it responds to these concerns in the B&M 
corporation.  This is unsurprising, but not entirely satisfactory.  The position of 
management as regards self-dealing in a B&M corporation with widely distributed 
shareholders presents an extreme version of the position of a controlling shareholder 
whose control is leveraged: there exists a very large wedge between B&M company 
management’s control and its equity.    
16 
 
The analysis of how to address the potential for self-dealing in a controlled company 
thus partly parallels the analysis of how to address the potential for self-dealing in the 
B&M setting.  As discussed in the Introduction, a controlling shareholder has an 
incentive to capture a disproportionate share of the benefits of effective monitoring by 
diverting resources to entities in which he has a larger equity stake.  The use of leveraged 
control allows capturing economies of scale and scope in monitoring, but at the cost of 
heightened incentives to self-deal.  Interested transactions may have value in this context 
as well; the legal task is to distinguish the good from the bad.  Efficient legal rules and 
effective judicial enforcement apparently permit the state to realize the agency cost 
reductions from more effective monitoring by controlling shareholders while constraining 
excessive self dealing. 
 The controlled corporation is more difficult to regulate than the B&M company, 
however.  In the B&M company, the task is to permit interested transactions but under 
terms that replicate arms’ length transactions.  In the controlled company context, the 
task is more complex.  The controlling shareholder’s incentive to monitor managers and 
otherwise effectively to implement projects is too low because the shareholder holds less 
than all of the cash flow rights.  Permitting controllers to extract PBC from valuable 
transactions partly overcomes the disincentive to maximize that diluted cash flow rights 
create.  Requiring self-interested transactions exactly to mimic market transactions, 
however, could prevent a controlling shareholder from consuming any PBC. As a result, 
some efficient  transactions would not take place.  The regulatory task for controlled 
companies therefore is to permit economically valuable transactions while also permitting 
appropriate levels of PBS consumption; in other words, to permit PBC to the extent that 
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the benefits to non-controlling shareholders from better monitoring exceed the costs of 
PBC.  We argue next that contract and legal standards achieve this task better than ex 
ante prohibitions. 
D.  The Choice between Ex Ante and Ex Post Regulation in Companies with a 
Controlling Shareholder  
 
Conditional on the expertise and effectiveness of the judicial system, it is 
straightforward to demonstrate the superiority of ex post judicial review.  Let the 
substantive law be that in Delaware,34 and further assume that, as is essentially the case in 
all jurisdictions, the rules governing interested transactions are mandatory; that is, 
individual corporations cannot alter them.  Delaware law subjects interested transactions 
– those with the potential to create PBC – to searching judicial review under an entire 
fairness standard.  This standard requires that the terms of the interested transaction to 
fall within a range of reasonableness in relation to those of arms length transactions.  
Courts thus implicitly recognize that some level of PBC consumption is acceptable, but a 
reasonableness standard is required importantly to constrain their extent.   
Rough empirical evidence supports this view of judicial performance.  Different 
measures suggest that the value of controlling shares exceeds that of minority shares in 
U.S. corporations, but by only a small amount.35 Correspondingly, in the U.S., we 
observe companies with both widely distributed and controlling shareholder structures.   
Judicial review, that is, allows different corporate control structures to emerge 
                                                
34 We often refer to Delaware law because more than half of US public corporations are incorporated 
in Delaware, and Delaware law influences the law in other states. 
35   Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis 
68 J. FIin. Econ. 325 (2003).; Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An 
International Comparison, 59 J. Fin. 537 (2004). 
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endogenously.  Put another way, PBC consumption is at levels that support a controlling 
shareholder structure when it is efficient.36 
Turning to ex ante structural restrictions, we begin with the familiar justifications for 
mandatory rules.  First, mandatory rules are used to prohibit transactions that create 
negative externalities.  Second, mandatory rules may protect parties who cannot make 
maximizing choices, either in consequence of cognitive error or an irremediable 
information deficit.  Neither justification applies strongly to the mandatory judicial 
review just discussed.  Controlling shareholders internalize the costs of consuming PBC, 
capital markets are information rich and the buy side participants – the public 
shareholders -- are sophisticated.37 
 Ex ante structural restrictions on control represent the strongest form of 
mandatory rule.  The restrictions cannot rest on the usual justifications for mandatory 
rules.  Rather, the argument must be that ex post constraints  inevitably fail; they result in 
excessive PBC consumption.  The argument here rejects this view.  Rather, restricting 
control structures that present conflicts of interest, as opposed to policing the terms of 
actual conflicted transactions, lumps efficient and inefficient transactions together, 
thereby eliminating both.   
 
III. Contract and Judicial Expertise 
                                                
36 Gilson, supra note 1. 
37 Controlling shareholders bring to market the projects that reflect the privately optimal tradeoff 
between a controller’s payoff through his cash flow rights and his payoff from PBC consumption.  The 
capital market may prefer a different mix. This reasoning implies that the controllers may not seek external 
finance for the highest valuing projects (in expectation) in their project portfolios.  This externality is hard 
to regulate because project portfolios, in contrast to actual projects, usually are unobservable by third 
parties. 
19 
 
A. Contracting with standards and formal agreements 
 We noted above that ex post judicial review can take two forms: (a) The courts’ 
application of a mandatory entire fairness-like standard to interested transactions; (b) The 
same standard but expressed as a default rule that permits express contracting about PBC 
consumption.  The courts’ role in the default rule setting would be to police the 
contracting process for procedural fairness (including approval requirements) and 
disclosure, and to enforce the PBC contract adopted.   
We argue here that the current mandatory regime should be demoted to a regime of 
PBC defaults.  As premise, realize that controlled firms that offer stock to the public 
credibly commit to abide by the caps conditional on (and to the extent of) the 
effectiveness of judicial enforcement. Hence, the claim we made in Part II actually holds 
that credible commitment to particular PBC levels through the application of a judicially 
imposed standard is preferable to ex ante prohibitions. 
We support this argument further with three assumptions: (a) there can be efficiency 
gains as well as agency costs when a controlling shareholder consumes pecuniary private 
benefits; (b) capital market investors are sophisticated, and so can evaluate commercial 
transactions that are proposed to them; (c) outside investors contribute money to 
controlled companies only on terms acceptable to the investors.  These assumptions 
together imply that expert application of legal standards limiting PBC consumption 
increases efficiency.  Assumption (c) holds that a controlling shareholder who needs 
external finance would engage in interested transactions only if the transactions generated 
expected returns that equal or exceed the investors’ opportunity cost of funds – that is, 
there are net gains from PBC consumption.  Assumption (a) implies that terms attractive 
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to outside investors will maximize the efficiency gains and minimize the agency costs 
associated with the controlling shareholder’s resort to the equity market.  Assumption (b), 
in turn, implies that potential shareholders of controlled companies can evaluate the 
transactions that controlling shareholders propose.   
 On the three assumptions, the ex post application of legal standards capping PBC 
has some of the virtues that explicit contracting generally has.  To begin, if PBC 
consumption is challenged, the controlled company will inform the court about the nature 
of the challenged transactions, which will inform the court’s view of what is reasonable.  
Because commercial parties can choose and implement maximizing strategies, judicial 
review under standards partly reflects the virtues of private ordering.  Further, parties 
internalize the costs and benefits of transactions.  Here, the controlling shareholder who 
is selling stock pays in the form of a lower equity price for the later opportunity to 
consume PBC; hence, it  has an incentive to cap such private benefits at efficient levels.  
The three assumptions that generate these conclusions are weak.  Assumptions (b) 
and (c) posit rational and capable capital market investors.  In the United States, 
institutional investors hold over 70% of the shares of the 1000 largest publicly traded 
companies.38   We have argued above that assumption (a) – that there are good and bad 
aspects to PBC acquisition – is plausible.  There remains, then, the important 
assumption– that courts are capable, as a general matter, of distinguishing controlled 
transactions that use PBC consumption to motivate efficient controller monitoring and 
other efforts from transactions that are exploitative.  As we have stressed, it is centrally 
                                                
38 The Conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investor Report: Trends in Asset Allocation and Portfolio 
Composition, Table 10 (2011). 
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this assumption that allows a controlling shareholder to commit to efficient levels of 
PBC. 
Part IV discusses this assumption in detail.  We note here that generalist courts may 
have difficulty but specialized courts exist, and more could be created.  The Delaware 
Chancery Court, the new Israeli Corporate court and the Commercial Part of the New 
York State Supreme court are examples.  These courts are composed of judges with 
business experience and the cases they see fall into limited and repetitive patterns.  This 
permits the judges to develop expertise.39. 
B. The Case for Contract: Judicial Standards and Explicit Agreements 
Were the law to reduce the mandatory rule covering transactions with controlling 
shareholders to a default that allowed the corporation to specify by explicit contract the 
standards governing transactions with a controlling shareholder, the controlled 
corporation (and, implicitly, its minority shareholders) of course could continue to rely 
upon the standards that compose the current mandatory legal rule.  Hence, the contracting 
reform would not make things worse.  Turning to the reform itself, the current legal 
regime creates considerable uncertainty for controlling shareholders, for two reasons.  
First, controlling shareholders must predict what the minority shareholders will approve.  
Second, courts exercise independent review, under the entire fairness standard, of 
privately approved transactions.  Hence, the controlling shareholders must also predict 
what the courts will approve.  Judicial application of a mandatory standard is harder for 
                                                
39 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles Sabel and Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of 
Generalist Courts, forthcoming N.Y.U.L.Rev. (forthcoming 2013), develop how expert courts like the 
Delaware  Chancery Court can extend the use of standards in the face of uncertainty to police opportunistic 
behavior with respect to commercial transactions within common categories but which have important 
idiosyncratic elements that the parties may seek to exploit.   
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the controlling shareholder to predict than the preferences of the company’s directors or 
shareholders because generalist courts have less expertise than company officials and 
may have different normative preferences.  In any event, controlled shareholders must 
incur considerable costs preparing project proposals to the independents, and additional 
costs defending those proposals in court.  The uncertainty that the current two levels of 
review create – first the minority, then the judge --  can chill the pursuit of efficient 
projects: the likelihood of ultimate approval may be too low to justify the project 
exploration expense.  Express contracts, we argue below, would reduce uncertainty and 
therefore increase efficiency.        
A simple model clarifies these points.  Assume again that Delaware law obtains.  Let 
it cost the controlling shareholder ch to explore and present for approval to a committee 
of independent directors a project that may have high value.  It costs cl to explore and 
present a low value project.  We assume ch > cl because high value projects are generally 
harder to find and more complex to evaluate and to explain.  The probability that the 
controlling shareholder locates a high value project and gets it approved is increasing in 
his exploration and preparation efforts.  A high value project, if uncovered, returns vh; the 
low value project returns vl.  All projects are interested transactions: that is, the 
controlling shareholder will consume PBC from realized project returns.  Denote the 
probability that investigation reveals a high value project as p(ch) if the controlling 
shareholder invests ch.  We assume that (a) low value projects exist and that vl – cl > 0 for 
any such project;  and (b) for convenience, that the controlling shareholder can discover a 
low value project and get it approved if he invests cl in exploration and presentation cost.  
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The issue is whether the controlling shareholder will attempt to find high value projects 
when it is ex ante efficient to do so. 
The timing follows: 
t0: The controlling shareholder develops a portfolio of possible projects to explore 
seriously. 
t1: The controlling shareholder investigates project possibilities. 
t2: The controlling shareholder prepares a report to the independent directors of the 
project he locates. 
t3: The report is presented. 
t4: The directors always accept low value projects but may reject or accept a high 
value project.  
t5: A minority shareholder seeks judicial review of an approved high value project.40 
t6: The court rejects or accepts. 
The probability that the independent directors accepts a high value project is 0 ! " < 1; 
the probability that a court later accepts an approved high value project is 0 < # < 1.41  
Hence, the ex ante probability that the controlling shareholder can pursue a high value 
project if he locates one is $ = "# < 1. 
                                                
40 PBS consumption, in our view, is best understood as the controlling shareholder taking a share of 
firm value.  This implies that the amount of PBC the shareholder is expected to consume, in absolute 
dollars, is an increasing function of expected project value.  Low value projects therefore are less 
controversial than high value projects.  Independent directors are more likely to accept low value projects 
and minority shareholders are less likely to challenge them.   For convenience, and to simplify notation, we 
assume without loss of generality that minority shareholders never sue to reverse low value project 
approvals but always sue to reverse high value project approvals.   
41 Regarding these probabilities, we assume that independent directors may reject any high value 
project but courts do not reject approved projects with certainty. 
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 We begin at t0, when the controlling shareholder has a project portfolio and is 
choosing his investigation level.  To identify the first best, let the independent directors 
and the court accept a high expected value project with certainty.  The controlling 
shareholder then invests high effort if the marginal increase in expected value between 
the high and the low value project exceeds the marginal investigation and presentation 
cost.  Saving some algebra, we write this condition as 
(1) p(ch)%v  > %c 
where %v = vh – vl and %c = ch – cl.  The LHS is the marginal value difference; the RHS 
is the marginal cost difference. 
Now assume, realistically, that a controlling shareholder expects a high value project 
to be approved with probability $.  Then he incurs the high cost to locate a high value 
project if 
(2) p(ch)%v > ch/$ - cl 
Expression (2) is harder to satisfy than Expression (1) because the approval probability $ 
is less than one, so the first term on the RHS exceeds the investigation cost.  Intuitively, 
when approval is uncertain, investigation costs are more likely to be wasted so the 
controlling shareholder will investigate fewer possibly efficient projects.   
 To review, Part 2 argued that PBC can increase the controlling shareholder’s 
incentive to monitor managers and otherwise to invest effort in implementing projects.  
Part 3 argues that the current mandatory legal disapproval of PBC acquisition creates 
considerable uncertainty; controllers must predict the preferences of their own minority 
and the reviewing court regarding particular controlled transactions.  The probability that 
a controlled transaction will ultimately be approved is materially less than one.  A 
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consequence, we show here, is that controlling shareholders are less likely to locate 
possibly efficient projects to pursue. 
   Enforceable express contracts are preferable to these implicit contracts initially 
because they would materially increase the acceptance probability by reducing the 
likelihood of judicial error.  In stylized terms, a controlling shareholder would offer a 
contract to the independent directors at t0, after he has assembled a portfolio of potential 
projects but before he investigates. The contract likely would disclose possible projects 
the controller would pursue and propose associated PBC consumption levels. Bargaining 
thus would take place, and a contract would be accepted, before the investigation stage.  
Because the independent directors would then have signed on, the controlling shareholder 
would anticipate independent director approval of any high expected value project that he 
proposes.  Using the notation above, the probability of independent party acceptance, ", 
would be one.   
Courts also would be more likely to enforce than they are today because such explicit 
contracts, under our proposal, would be enforceable.  Thus, the likelihood of judicial 
approval, #, would rise as well.    Additionally, an explicit contract, tailored to particular 
transactions and parties, would reduce the likelihood of judicial error even by a generalist 
court.  As the joint acceptance probability, $, increases toward one, Expression (2) 
collapses to Expression (1).  Free contracting would expand the set of efficient projects 
controlled companies would pursue.42 
                                                
42 We assume that the controlling shareholder will not propose to the independent directors a low value 
project but claim that the project has high expected value.  The shareholder must disclose the nature of the 
project and the share of PBC he will consume.  For example, the project may contemplate sales between 
corporate entities both of which the shareholder controls at particular prices.  The shareholder is more 
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 Express contracting also would reduce transaction costs.  Under current law, the 
likelihood that courts uphold independent director approval of interested transactions is 
increasing in the size and apparent thoroughness of the record a controlling shareholder 
makes to the directors.  In the courts’ view, the more complete the controlling 
shareholder’s disclosure is, the better informed the independent parties are and the more 
likely the transaction is to be in the company’s interest.  Controlling shareholders, when 
choosing investigation levels, thus know that the total cost of obtaining acceptance of a 
high value project, which includes presentation cost, is high.  Referring to the model 
above, the courts’ attitude widens the wedge between the cost of exploring possible high 
value projects, ch, and the cost of pursuing low value projects, cl.  As both Expressions 
show, when this wedge widens, controlling shareholders are less likely to locate high 
value projects.  A contract reduces the cost of assembling  a record that must pass both 
independent director and judicial scrutiny.  In this way as well, allowing explicit 
contracting over PBC would increase the set of efficient projects that controlled 
companies pursue. 
Under a default rule approach, most lawsuits could be expected to involve moral 
hazard.  The common issue would be whether the controlling shareholder exceeded a 
contractual cap: that is, seized more PBC than bargained for.  Actions over PBC 
consumption thus may raise interpretive issues concerning even an explicit contract, 
although they may be of lesser burden than under a standard-based mandatory regime.   
                                                                                                                                            
likely to get a project approved by understating its profit potential than overstating it: to understate is to 
appear to take fewer PBC as a share of project returns.  Note that this reasoning underscores the importance 
of independent directors even where the controlling shareholder controls their election. 
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To summarize, current ex post judicial review under a mandatory standard requires 
that courts determine whether the PBC consumption associated with a particular 
interested transaction is within the zone of reasonableness.  In a default rule world, courts 
would police contracts for procedural fairness and interpret the substantive terms they 
contain, which may in some circumstances take a form similar to a zone of 
reasonableness standard, and in others may be more precisely tailored to the context of 
the particular company or transactions   A high level of expertise improves judicial 
performance of both tasks, the issue to which we now turn.        . 
IV.  The Centrality of Courts: A Proposal for Improving Ex Post Judicial Review of 
PBC Consumption 
 
We have stressed repeatedly that the argument in favor of ex post judicial review 
assumes that judicial systems are effective and staffed with judges who are experienced 
in complex commercial law, regardless of whether the court applies a mandatory legal 
standard or an explicit contract adopted under a default rule approach.  The first step in 
the analysis is straightforward – parties must anticipate that the judicial system will 
adjudicate private challenges to particular levels of PBC consumption within a 
commercially reasonable period of time.  As Professors Ferrarini and Guidici have 
stressed with respect to the PBC at the heart of the Parmalat scandal, substantive legal 
rules are irrelevant absent timely and effective enforcement.   The second step – of the 
critical role of judicial expertise – requires more detailed development.  Our discussion 
here parallels the discussion above.  We first consider the relevance of expertise when 
courts apply a mandatory standard to a transaction.  We then consider how expertise 
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manifests when courts adjudicate explicit contracts that regulate PBC under a default rule 
approach.  This sets the stage for our policy proposal.  
There is a general view that courts should regulate business behavior by reference 
to standards of conduct rather than specific rules. The argument roughly parallels the 
move from state contingent contracting to the use of standards as uncertainty increases.43   
A rule is most effective when there are few relevant states of the world and the mapping 
from actions to states is clear – that is, when there is little uncertainty.  Given these 
conditions, the court can apply, in effect, a state contingent rule that proscribes or 
requires clearly specified actions, and  can readily determine whether the rule has been 
followed. These conditions that make rules effective sometimes are satisfied for typical 
sales transactions, but they are much harder to satisfy, at the level of managing a 
company.44   Business contexts evolve rapidly so uncertainty is high, and can be expected 
to be particularly high in settings where the heightened monitoring and managerial skills 
of controlling shareholders are important.  The more the corporation’s current value 
depends on future growth options as to which management’s judgment is important and 
therefore the greater the uncertainty, the less workable are rules as opposed to standards; 
the very point of a standard is to allow for the judgment that a rule excludes.  Further, the 
efficient mix of PBC consumption and efficient managing can be expected to be context 
specific.  For these reasons, rules can be over or under inclusive. 
                                                
43 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Contest, supra note 25. 
44 An extensive analysis of when rules or standards are better contractual  regulatory devices is in Alan 
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, “Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law”, 113 Yale L. J. 541 
(2003). 
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The case for a regulatory standard then is straightforward:  when uncertainty 
prevents legislatures (or courts) from imposing state contingent rules, striking the 
appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of particular transactions requires 
standards.45  Under a standard – whether a particular transaction is reasonable is decided 
ex post.  The passage of time and the parties’ performance often resolves uncertainty 
about the effect of transactions. A court thus can make an informed judgment regarding a 
litigated transaction’s reasonableness. 
But the relationship between uncertainty and the effectiveness of standards is not 
monotonic.46  The cost of judicial application of standards is the risk the judge in 
applying the standard to particular facts will make type one and type two errors.  Parties 
anticipate the possibility of error when deciding how to craft their relationship in the first 
place.  If the law imposes a standard, and the error probability is large, parties then may 
use rules in their contracts despite the risk that under high uncertainty the rules will turn 
out to be wrong ex post.  Indeed, the possibility that the judge (or jury) will make an error 
can lead to moral hazard-based litigation (the party disfavored by fate litigating in the 
hope of winning the judicial error lottery).  Legislatures also may respond to the 
uncertainty standards can create by adopting knowingly inefficient prohibitions.47 
B.  Contracts and Judicial Expertise 
We assume in this section that legal restrictions on PBC take the form of defaults, so 
that parties can write express joint PBC/project contracts if they fit the parties and 
                                                
45 Recall that the regulatory task is to preserve the efficiency gains from better monitoring that PBC 
induces while curbing their excessive use. 
46 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract and Innovation, supra note 25. 
47 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 25. 
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transaction better than the default legal standard.  We expect these contracts to contain a 
mix of express terms and standards – in essence, to set out the context in which the 
controlling shareholder and the company are dealing and that of the transaction.  The 
express terms will describe possible or actual projects and the nature of PBC 
consumption under them.  For example, a lower firm in a pyramid will invest in a project 
and plan to trade with the market and with another firm in which the controlling 
shareholder has an interest.  He will consume PBC in connection with the interested party 
trades.   Depending on the circumstances, the contracts also may attempt to cap PBC 
through rule-like provisions, for example in the form of regulating the prices of interested 
party trades perhaps through the use of a pricing formula (as often used in long-term 
supply contracts).  Finally, because there is uncertainty in project pursuit, and moral 
hazard in the form of the controlling shareholder’s incentive to exceed a cap and in 
minority shareholder litigation over the cap, we expect the contracts likely will require 
standards as well that will bear some resemblance to the entire fairness standard: 
controlling shareholders will commit to confine PBC consumption to “reasonable” levels 
and provide guidance for the court’s interpretation of “reasonableness” in the context of 
the category of interested transactions covered by the contract.48 
Judicial expertise as described above consists of the ability to evaluate particular 
transactions, which can be characterized as composed of four general forms: (i) expertise 
in interpreting contractual language; (ii) expertise in evaluating evidence, especially trial 
                                                
48 This description is speculative.  Current law precludes express contracts except in limited 
circumstances (see n.23 supra),so there are no actual models.  We claim only plausibility here.  We note 
also that the standards will not permit unconfined judicial behavior.  The writing evidences the permitted 
and the standard includes difficult to predict applications. 
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evidence; (iii) expertise in inferring ex ante intended performances from actually 
rendered performances; and (iv) experience with the industry and with the types of 
transactions that come before the court.49  Courts in developed countries possess the first 
two types of expertise.  They are trained to read contracts and to conduct trials, and they 
commonly do both.  The third type of expertise is less common and generalist courts 
typically will not have the fourth.  The presence of the third and fourth types of expertise 
operates to make the first two types more effective. 
As an example of type (iii) expertise, consider a contract dispute.  The buyer rejects a 
machine because, he claims, it was supposed to perform a certain number of operations a 
minute, and it performs many fewer.  The seller agrees that the machine performs fewer 
operations than the buyer claims was intended, but argues that the parties intended only 
the actual performance the machine is capable of rendering.  Suppose also that machines 
that perform the larger number of operations have a particular configuration that the 
machine at issue lacks; rather, the machine involved in the litigation is configured such 
that producing a materially higher number of operations than it performs would create 
undue stress.  An expert adjudicator, such as an arbitrator who has experience in the 
industry, would understand machine types, and so would promptly recognize that the 
parties likely intended to trade the machine the seller tendered.  He would then order the 
buyer to pay unless the buyer could disprove the adjudicator’s plausible inference of the 
parties’ ex ante intentions.  An inexpert generalist court, that did not have industry 
experience, may require a trial to decide the case, and even then may be mistaken. 
                                                
49 This taxonomy is explained and applied in Alan Schwartz and Joel Watson, “Conceptualizing 
Contract Interpretation”, forthcoming J. Legal Stud. (2013). 
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Interpreting the PBC/project contracts described above requires similar expertise and 
experience.  To see why, consider the pyramid example above.  Let there be an optimal 
mix of market and interested trades for the product the controlled firm produces.  An 
objecting shareholder sues the controlling shareholder, claiming that although the 
interested trades were made at contractually set prices, which were known to be above 
market, there were too many interested trades.  The controlling shareholder imposed 
these trades, it is argued, as a device to exceed the PBC contractual cap; that is, actual 
PBC consumption violated the contract’s standard.   
An adjudicator who possesses the third and fourth types of expertise, in inferring 
intentions from performances and with industry and transactional experience that 
facilitates that inference, is more likely than a generalist court to decide this type of 
dispute correctly.  The expert adjudicator would have some industry knowledge, he 
would see many interested transactions and he would understand the strengths and 
temptations that the separation of cash flow and control rights make possible.  The expert 
thus would have some rough idea, in connection with a PBC consumption dispute, what 
mix of market and interested trades would be optimal and whether it was materially 
exceeded in the case before him.  Put differently, an experienced, expert court 
understands the context in which the contract over PBC extraction must be interpreted.50  
A generalist court would be much harder to inform and, once informed, would be more 
likely to make an error, the probability of which is increasing in the level of uncertainty.    
                                                
50 See Schwartz & Watson, supra note 51; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract and Innovation, supra note 
39. 
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As is apparent, the expertise of reviewing courts becomes central both to our 
argument that ex post judicial review under standards is preferable to ex ante structural 
reform, and to our argument that free contracting may be best of all.  It is the capacity of 
experienced commercial courts to apply standards even as uncertainty increases that 
provides the basis for our proposal here.  Whether applying mandatory fiduciary duties or 
interpreting contractual terms and especially contractual standards adopted in response to 
uncertainty, sophisticated commercial courts, coupled with timely enforcement, allow 
controlling shareholders to credibly commit to a level of PBC that can support efficient 
controlling shareholder corporate structures.  As we have seen, this expert ex post review 
is superior to rule-like prohibitions of leveraged control structures or more general 
restrictions on the prevalence of controlling shareholder structures like a mandatory bid 
rule.  
But the promise of efficient PBC consumption that increase minority 
shareholders’ investment by more than the PBC cost is a chimera to a corporation that is 
chartered in a jurisdiction without an effective, experienced judicial system; absent 
expertise, standards are workable over a narrower range of uncertainty, so the efficient 
outcome is not feasible.51  For these jurisdictions, the logical response is to rely more 
heavily on ex ante structural restrictions and on rule-like constraints, with the result that 
corporations are denied access to control structures that may be efficient in particular 
circumstances.  And it is correct but of limited value to recommend that the jurisdiction 
develop an effective judicial system.  Crafting the institutions and norms that support an 
                                                
51 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 25. 
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effective judicial system takes substantial time; 52 in the meantime, companies 
incorporated in that jurisdiction, predictably with a high likelihood of a controlling 
shareholder, will continue to pay a higher cost of capital because of the absence of a way 
to commit credibly to a level of PBC 
A better alternative to waiting for domestic institutions to evolve would be for the 
European Union to facilitate controlling shareholders’ credible commitment to limit PBC 
by creating an EU level specialized commercial court that could manage the use of 
standards under high uncertainty.  This is particularly important because it is in precisely 
those “bad law” countries that the Law and Finance literature tells us we are most likely 
to have economies dominated by companies with controlling shareholders.  Thus, an EU-
level commercial court takes advantage of scale economies in judicial reform in just the 
settings where the pay off to expertise is the greatest.  Individual corporations could elect 
through their articles of incorporation to have interested transactions reviewed by the EU 
commercial court rather than the courts of the jurisdiction under whose laws the 
corporation is formed.53  In our vision, the EU court would apply the law of the state of 
incorporation, but with greater speed and expertise, and therefore lower error rates in the 
face of uncertainty, than could be mustered in the home state.  When this condition is not 
met, the corporation would remain under the jurisdiction of domestic courts.  In this 
respect, our proposal differs greatly from the thrust of prior EU efforts to address 
corporate law.  Unlike the variety of EU company law directives, the creation of an EU 
                                                
52 See Jens Dammannn & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commerical Litigation, 94 Cornell L.Rev. 1 
(2008). 
53 The expertise and efficiency of the Delaware Chancery Court, rather than any special character of 
Delaware law, is in our view the best explanation for the persistent preference for U.S. public corporations 
to incorporate in Delaware  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Text and Context, supra note 25.   
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commercial court would not impose mandatory rules that harmonize substantive 
corporate law; individual corporations would have to opt into its jurisdiction.54  And 
unlike the European Company Law, the corporation that opts in accepts an enforcement 
process, not a body of substantive law. 
To be sure, we recognize that there are important jurisprudential issues that would 
have to be addressed in the actual design of a European commercial court, and serious 
political problems that would have to be overcome for the effort to be successful.  For 
example, a federalist system with two levels of courts confronts a range of vertical – 
federal law versus (member) state law—choice of law issues (as opposed to horizontal 
issues concerning which member state’s law applies).  In the United States, the resolution 
has taken the form of having a federal court adjudicating a state substantive law issue 
apply federal procedural rules but state substantive law.  So for example, an EU-level 
commercial court might adopt its own rules concerning class actions, but be bound by 
member state rules on who could bring derivative suits.  Thus, the determination of the 
corporate law techniques available for enforcement remains at the member state level.55  
Only the skill of the court changes. 
A careful consideration of these issues is beyond our ambition here and likely our 
ken as well.  But recognizing these concerns, an opt-in European court gives all European 
corporations the capacity for credible commitment that allows access to efficient control 
structures regardless of the varied quality of judicial system across the EU.  Of equal 
                                                
54 Elements of the Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers has this opt-in like characteristics.  However, the 
13th Directive is nonetheless directed at substantive law. 
55 These rules vary significantly among member states. See Enriques, supra note 17; Conac, Enriques 
& Gelter, supra note 19. 
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significance, it will have the greatest impact where the absence of an effective judicial 
system imposes the highest cost of capital penalty on the presence of a controlling 
shareholder.   
V.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze a continuum of approaches to constraining private 
benefits of control:  ex ante structural restrictions on control and ex post transaction 
review.  Regulation of controlling shareholders in the European Union includes 
significant ex ante structural restrictions. Because of the fear of PBC, the EU directly 
regulates companies’ control structures and shareholder distribution patterns.  EU 
member states frequently prohibit the use of dual class common stock; and EU law leans 
against controlling shareholder regimes generally through the directive-level mandatory 
bid rule.  This strategy of ex ante control mechanisms is premised on the fear that 
controlling shareholders will take too much PBC -- that is, an amount that is greater than 
the minority shareholders’ gain from the controlling shareholder’s better monitoring.  In 
contrast, regulation of controlling shareholders in the United States leans in the other 
direction.  Rather than ex ante structural restrictions on control structures, the leading 
U.S. jurisdiction – Delaware -- imposes a legal rule that subjects transactions with 
controlling shareholders or their affiliates to ex post “entire fairness" review by an expert 
court, which is interpreted to mean that the terms of a transaction must be within a range 
of reasonableness in relation to market prices.  Contingent on intelligent enforcement by 
sophisticated commercial courts, ex post judicial review has a number of useful benefits, 
all of which are improvements over the ex ante prohibitions of leveraged control 
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structures or, more generally, that restrict the emergence of controlling shareholder 
regimes through the mandatory bid rule, that we observe in the EU.  
These benefits are as follows. First, ex post transactional review allows control 
structures that have the potential to provide better monitoring and hence better 
performance than a B&M style company.  Second, by capping the amount of PBC 
through effective judicial review, the lemons problem of companies having to pay though 
the cost of capital for excessive PBC is avoided.  Companies could make credible 
commitments to efficient levels of PBC.  Third, by allowing some range of PBC -- the "in 
the range of reasonableness" measure -- corporations can secure the benefits of a 
controlling shareholder’s more effective monitoring when it is efficient.  This allows the 
determination of control structures to be endogenized.  We also argue that treating an 
entire fairness- like standard as a default, rather than as mandatory, probably could 
achieve these benefits at least as well, and perhaps better, than mandatory legal standards. 
The next step in our analysis is that central to the US approach – generally 
allowing leveraged control structures and not penalizing controlling shareholders -- is the 
existence of efficient and sophisticated courts to apply legal standards and interpret 
contracts.   The centrality of judicial expertise to ex post regulation leads to our reform 
proposal.  As Ferrarini and Giudici observe with respect to Italy,  the problem is not so 
much the substantive legal rules, as much as it is the absence of an efficient, experienced 
court system and, to be sure, corporate law that allows claims to be brought.  In this 
situation, a company cannot credibly commit not to consume PBC in excess of the gains 
from better monitoring.  The cost of capital then goes up regardless of a company’s 
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intention to limit levels of PBC consumption.  Under those circumstances, it is 
understandable that some member states prohibit leveraged control structures. 
We offer an alternative: an effective judicial system that allows sophisticated 
judicial application of standards.  The EU could achieve such a system by creating a 
European Commercial Court, to whose jurisdiction a corporation may opt in.  Unlike the 
European Company statute, it is process rather than substantive law that is voluntarily 
harmonized; the applicable substantive law remains that of the state of incorporation.  
Less modestly, we argue that the same specialized court can support a more expansive 
reform: making legal rules concerning review of interested transactions a default, which 
the corporation can change by contract.  In both the modest and expansive reform, the 
insight is that ex post review of interested transactions rather than ex ante leaning against 
particular forms of control structures allows controlling shareholders to credibly commit 
to efficient levels of PBC. 
 
 
  
 
